Updated: 15 January 2013
Updated: 15 January 2013
From the book Air Disasters by Stanley Stewart reproduced with permission - Page Updated: 15 January 2013
(Image removed by order of Manchester United Limited)
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Preface On the above date a tragedy almost unparalleled in sporting history took place at Munich Airport. What exactly happened on that dreadful date was relatively unknown to me until recently. Everyone has their own ideas about what happened, who was to blame and why it happened. This is the definitive story behind this accident which robbed United of seven players, some officials and the press lost some good reporters and photographers. One of which was Frank Swift, ex Manchester City goalkeeping giant and legend. The following report is sometimes technical. Sometimes you will be tempted to skip paragraphs but please don't - to fully understand what went wrong, who lied to cover it up and where the blame still lies to this day, you must read it all. I have split it into 3 pages to make loading times easier. The fact is that evidence WAS covered up; officials lying through their teeth to protect their own interests and evidence was deliberately sabotaged. I suspect that the West German Government at that time had something very evil to do with all this. Read for yourself - see what you think? Background In the middle of the 1950s a great English football team won the affection of the entire British nation with their displays of football magic and skill. In 1957, Manchester United, with manager Matt Busby and his famous Busby Babes were trying to emulate the previous season’s efforts by once again attempting to scoop the honours at home and abroad. Not a man over thirty, and most of the talent home grown from the local area through Matt Busby's pioneering work on youth development, the fresh young team attracted much support from near and far. This was the result of a dream being built by Matt Busby, the Manager that United entrusted with the rebuilding of the club following on from the end of WW2 in 1945. Old Trafford itself had to be rebuilt first! By tradition the affairs of the great Manchester club were conducted in the manner of a different long gone era. The first team players were treated like gods and were expected to behave and dress accordingly. The changing room was forbidden territory to all outside the elite, and even within the team a certain decorum was observed. The Captain was expected to remain aloof from the other players and by custom lunched only with the manager, not his team mates, before a match. Yet pay during the season was only £20 per week, with a £4 bonus for a win, and £17 a week in the summer months. In the previous season Manchester United, by way of their growing reputation, had been invited as the first British club to participate in the expanding European Cup Championship. The team justified its renown by reaching the semi finals where they were knocked out of the tough competition by a strong Real Madrid side, the eventual winners. In the same year they were also defeated by Aston Villa in the FA Cup Final, but managed to finish the season by winning the League Championship, thus qualifying for another attempt at the European Cup. In these days only champions of their respective country qualified. Now in the 1957/58 season, Manchester United were battling successfully, if at times a little shakily, towards triumph in all three contests. In the European Cup, the first leg against the Czech Champions Dukla brought victory at Old Trafford, the revered home ground, with a 3-0 win. On 4th December 1957, a confident Manchester United side flew to Prague to play the second leg of the tie. The result and the journey home proved to be less than satisfactory. United suffered a 1-0 defeat but, with a win on aggregate, qualified for the Quarter Finals in which they were to meet Red Star Belgrade. On arrival at Prague airport, the flight was found to be indefinitely delayed due to fog in Manchester. And it quickly became apparent that, with heavy bookings on other flights, there was a real risk of the team being unable to get home in time for their next League fixture. The party was eventually accommodated on two flights, with the team returning via Amsterdam and the press returning via Zurich and Birmingham. It was a tired but relieved United that finally arrived back home. On 14th January 1958 the first leg of the Quarter Final was won 2-1 at home v Red Star with the return leg set for Wednesday 5th February in Belgrade. Welcome as the victory was, the most slender of leads did not leave any room for complacency. To compound the situation, United were scheduled to meet Wolverhampton Wanderers, the current League leaders, in an important match on the Saturday afternoon following the Belgrade game. A match that could ultimately decide the destination of the Championship. Any disruption of flights to or from Yugoslavia similar to the Prague flights would place an unbearable strain on the already heavily overtaxed team. To alleviate some of the pressure, it was decided to charter a plane for the sole use of the Manchester party, including team, officials and press. British European Airways (BEA) was approached and a 47 seater Air Ambassador, named the Elizabethan class by the airline, was duly acquired for the travellers. This was to be the first time United would travel in other than a scheduled commercial flight.
On February 3rd the entire Manchester United party boarded aircraft G-ALZU (Known as Zulu Uniform) under the command of Captain James Thain for charter flight B-line 609 from Manchester to Belgrade. The route was arranged via Munich both ways for refuelling as a direct route was out of range. At the airport the Asst Team Manager, Jimmy Murphy, was there to see them off. In his other capacity as Manager of the Welsh National team he was required in Cardiff for a forthcoming international against Israel and was to remain behind. On board, the party settled down for the journey that lay ahead whilst the Captain checked the passenger list, reading the names like a “Who’s Who” of British Football greats. Roger Byrne, 28, the clubs team captain and Manchester born. Geoff Bent; Jackie Blanchflower, brother of Irish International Danny, Bobby Charlton, brother of the equally famous Jackie; Eddie Colman, 21, a schoolboy discovery; Duncan Edwards, 21, once the youngest ever player to play for England; Billy Foulkes; Harry Gregg, goalkeeper, bought recently for £23000; Mark Jones, 24, another schoolboy discovery; Ken Morgans, 18, the youngest of the “Babes” – who, once selected – he was never dropped and during the current season had played 28 times and United never lost one game. David Pegg, 22, International; Tommy Taylor, most expensive player (4 years previous transferred from Barnsley for £29,999). Dennis Violett; Bill Whelan. An unprecedented list of British football talent of which the total complement was valued at the then astonishing sum of £350,000. With Matt Busby, himself a past player for rivals Manchester City, as well as a former Scottish international, and now the much respected manager since his appointment after the war, were a dedicated threesome. Walter Crickmer, secretary; Bert Whalley, coach, and Tom Curry, trainer. Each had been with the club since the 30s. The press were also well represented in the party with many reporters from local and national papers. The Outbound Flight
On the Sunday before departure, Captain James Thain; his co-pilot Ken Rayment and Radio Officer George (Bill) Rogers had moved the aircraft to Manchester from their BEA base in London in preparation for an early start. Accompanying them were the cabin staff who would look after the party. Steward William Cable; Stewardess’ Margaret Billis and Rosemary Cheverton. In the cockpit the flight crew were not the usual complement, as the co pilot, Ken Rayment, was a full Captain in his own right and slightly senior to James Thain and more experienced. The co pilot position would normally be filled by a First Officer, but the two pilots were friends and had made a special request to fly this one together. James Thain was also Chairman of the British Airline Pilots Association. Thain was still the pilot in command of the flight, irrespective of the fact that a more senior and experienced pilot sat in the co pilots seat. This arrangement, although not rare, was to have far reaching consequences for Captain Thain in the events which lay ahead. The trip outbound was not uneventful. The transit through Munich was accomplished with little difficulty, but Belgrade was a different matter. The city was in the grip of winter with low cloud, poor visibility and snow obscuring the runway. Minimum limits of cloud base height and visibility are set at airports by each airline depending on certain items such as local terrain and availability of landing aids. When the weather deteriorates below these limits an approach to land is not permitted and if improvements are not forthcoming a diversion to another airport is required. The conditions at Belgrade were precisely on the limit and demanded some skilful flying in the let down pattern, as the aircraft had to break cloud at just the right point and height for a final approach and landing to be attempted. At that time BEA employed the “monitored approach” procedure, a system which is still used by some airlines to this day. In this case the pilot who is operating the sector and who will land the aircraft does not handle the controls during the approach but monitors the other pilots flying the procedure on instruments while frequently peering into the cloud for sight of the runway. With the landing strip in view the operating pilot then takes control and lands the aircraft. Such a system avoids the sometime difficult transition from instruments to visual flying as the aircraft breaks cloud when one pilot flies the entire approach and landing. During the approach to Belgrade, Captain Thain, as operating pilot, had relinquished the flying to his co pilot, and only a masterly piece of instrument flying by Rayment allowed Thain successfully to take control at cloud break and to land the aircraft, a fine demonstration of Ken Rayment’s ability and skill. In the prevailing conditions the station engineer was not expecting an imminent arrival and only realised that Zulu Uniform, the Manchester charter flight, had landed when it taxied on to the parking apron. Belgrade
By Wednesday 5th February 1958 the weather had improved with clear skies and sunshine. The pitch at the Army Football Ground was cleared of snow, except for a few specks, and a large and enthusiastic crowd gathered in the packed stadium to watch the game. Throughout Europe fans watched for the result in anticipation. The game proved to be hard, tough and sometimes dirty, but by half time, United were 3-0 to the good. Throughout the second half Red Star chipped away at United’s lead and the whistle went at 3-3. A tired but relieved United had got through to the semi finals of the European Cup for the second year running. After the game, a cocktail party for the United players followed at the British Embassy with much larking about amongst the young and jubilant team. At home fans celebrated. The next morning, Thursday 6th February 1958, the still high spirited players assembled with other members of the party at Belgrade airport for the return flight to Manchester, via Munich. An extra 5 people were travelling, including the wife and baby daughter of the Yugoslav air attaché in London. Total travelling back would now be 38. On board the 47 seater aircraft there was plenty of room for the passengers to sit comfortably, sitting where they pleased. Since Captain Thain had flown the outbound journey, Captain Rayment would fly the return legs. The two Captains changed seats as Rayment was uncomfortable flying the plane from the right hand, co pilot seat and Captain Thain, as the non handling pilot took the right hand co pilots seat. The departure from Belgrade was pleasant enough in intermittent sunshine, but the forecast for Munich was less than satisfactory, low cloud, rain and snow. The descent into Munich through 18000 feet of cloud required switching on of the anti icing which permitted hot air heated to 60 degrees centigrade by fuel burners in the wing to be vented under pressure via ducts at the leading edges of the wings, tail plane and fin. The aircraft broke cloud at 500 feet above ground to a grey, bleak and overcast day, with the runway just visible where previous aircraft had left black marks in the slush and snow. The touch down was normal, but on roll out great plumes of water sprayed upwards from both sides of the nose wheel. The drizzle had been falling for some time and had turned to snow, although the temperature remained above freezing and Zulu Uniform had to taxi across the apron through a watery paste of slush and snow to the parking bay by the terminal building. The time was just after 1315 GMT (1415 local). As the flight crew walked through the wet snow on the tarmac to the airport weather centre, refuelling had already begun. Bill Black, station engineer, supervised the refuelling of the 2 x 500 gallon tanks; one in each wing. As the only licensed Elizabethan engineer on duty, he could not authorize, for technical reasons, the use of the underwing pressurised fuelling system. The local ground staff had to resort to the use of the emergency fillers on top of the wings. Although still snowing, the wings were warm from the anti icing descent, with the temperature still above freezing, any flakes settling on the upper wing surfaces simply melted and ran from the trailing edge. The German refueller, therefore, had little problem maintaining a foot grip as he walked over the wing, which was just as well, for he soon became an easy target for the snowballs thrown by the Manchester party as they disembarked for refreshments in the terminal building. After completion of departure details the crew returned to the aircraft, stopping to inspect the wings. As a precaution de-icing fluid could be sprayed onto the wings or snow brushed clear but this was deemed unnecessary under the circumstances. For those unfamiliar with aerodynamics it is important to point out here that aircraft lift is obtained from an airflow speeding up as it flows the long way round over the upper surfaces of the wing, causing a reduction in pressure. Any ice or snow accretion on upper surfaces deteriorates lift production by spoiling the airflow and all upper surfaces must be maintained free of snow or ice. On inspection of Zulu Uniform’s wings a thin film was just visible, already thawing, and a stream of water could be seen dripping from the trailing edges of the wings. The two Captain’s conferred, decided against de-icing and passed their comment onto the station engineer. Captain’s of other aircraft, however, seemed to require de-icing to be undertaken, more from a matter of routine than anything else, as it strictly wasn’t required. Take Off From Munich
At 1420 hrs GMT (1520hrs local) just over 1 hour after arrival, with the lively band of passengers aboard, Zulu Uniform called Munich Tower to apply for taxi clearance for the final leg of the journey to Manchester, and home. This was the R/T conversation that took place: ZU = Zulu Uniform; MT = Munich Tower. ZU: Munich Tower, B-line 609 Zulu Uniform, taxi clearance, please. MT: 609 Zulu Uniform, Munchen Tower, wind two nine zero, eight knots. Cleared to runway two five. QNH one zero zero four, time one nine and a quarter, over. ZU: Roger, Thank you. (The magnetic direction of the runway, rounded up to the nearest 10 degrees with the last digit omitted: eg: the actual runway magnetic direction of 246 degrees became 250 degrees, becoming 25. QNH barometric pressure). The runway was known to be covered by about 2cm of slush which, at that time, was not considered excessive, especially since a path seemed to have been trodden through much of the surface used for take off and landing by previous aircraft. 2 mins later ZU approached the threshold and was cleared on to the runway. MT: B-line 609, cleared to line up and hold, and here is your clearance, over. ZU: 609 understand. I got to line up and hold and I am ready for the clearance. MT: Munich Control clears B-line 609 ZU to the Manchester airport via amber airway one zero, green airway one, amber two, amber one and route as filed. Maintain one seven thousand feet. Right turn after take off. Climb to the south course inbound to the Freising range, over. ZU repeated the clearance with the incorrect statement that a southbound heading inbound to the Freising radio range was required and a request was made for confirmation. MT: 609, that is not correct. Climb on the south course of the Freising range inbound to the range, over. ZU: Right turn out, the south course inbound to the Freising radio range, over. MT: Ah, That is correct. The aircraft lined up on the runway, and with brakes confirmed set, power was opened up for a final engine run in order to check performance before departure. MT: B-line 609, how long will it take for the engine run, over. ZU: Half a minute. MT: Ah, Roger. Your clearance expires at three one. Time now three zero. With the engine run hastily concluded all drills were now completed in preparation for departure. ZU: Ah, Munich. 609 Zulu Uniform – I am ready for take off. MT: 609 Zulu Uniform, wind two nine zero, one zero knots, cleared for take off, right turn, out. ZU: Thank you. As the aircraft moved off Radio Officer Bill Rogers made a final call indicating that the run had begun. ZU: Rolling. Captain Rayment opened up the throttles and moved both levers slowly forward with his right hand while Thain followed through with his left. With the throttles against the stops Thain rapped Rayment’s hand as an indication he should relinquish control, then made some final adjustments to the setting. As procedure demanded Rayment requested “check full power”, while his right hand remained poised ready to close the throttles quickly in the event of a full stop being required. Thain confirmed “full power set” and then a little later “temperatures and pressures ok, warning lights out”. The aircraft continued to accelerate with little indication of the retarding effect of the slush while Thain called out the increasing speeds. Suddenly an uneven tone in the engines was detected which spelled alarm. A quick instrument scan was in order, but just as Thain’s eyes caught the fluctuating pressure gauges Rayment called out “abandon take off”. His right hand slammed closed the throttles, catching Thain’s fingers before he could move to hold forward the control column as Rayment applied full brakes. Zulu Uniform decelerated quickly and slithered to a halt some way down the runway. ZU: 609, we are abandoning the take off. MT: Tower, say again please? ZU: We are abandoning the take off, may we backtrack please? MT: 609, cleared to backtrack. ZU: Thank you. The problem was the familiar one of “boost surging”. Neither Captain had been happy with the uneven engine note and fluctuating pressure and both were in agreement over the termination of the take off. As Thain blew on his skinned knuckles Rayment apologised for the injury, having little need to explain that the moment had not called for delay. Boost surging had been experienced by both pilots in the past as the Elizabethan had been somewhat prone to the problem when first introduced into service and Rayment himself had had similar experiences at Munich. The cause was due to an over rich mixture upsetting the fuel distribution and resulting in some cylinders operating in a rich condition. The problem was therefore more acute where the air was thin at high altitude airports such as Munich which lay only 70 miles north of the Alps at an elevation of more than 1700 feet. Any power reduction resulting from “boost surging” was stated to be only marginal, but it was hardly surprising that the pilots were somewhat sceptical of the theory and rather wary of the uncomfortable condition. One answer to boost surging was to open the throttle slowly so it was decided to try the take off once more, applying this approach. As Zulu Uniform started to taxi down the runway for a second attempt a transmission from the tower interrupted the discussion. MT: 609, for your information, we have a car on the runway which will be removed any second. ZU: Have a car on the runway? MT: Disregard. The car is leaving the runway now – it’s at the other end. Meanwhile on Zulu Uniform’s flight deck the deliberation continued. It was agreed the best procedure to adopt was firstly to open up the throttles a little on the brakes before commencing the roll, and then gradually to ease them up to full take off power during the run. Thain was to keep a careful eye on the boost pressure and rpm and to call out if there was anything he didn’t like. In the passenger cabin there was little consternation over the quick stop on the runway. After all, the weather was not particularly good and the abandoned take off could have been the result of many factors. Now the problem seemed to be solved and they would soon be on their way. Second Attempt Approaching the threshold of runway 25 clearance for departure was requested once more. ZU: Munich from 609 Zulu Uniform. When we get to the end of the runway we should like to take off again. Is the clearance still valid? MT: 609, your clearance is still valid. However, maintain five thousand feet until further advised. The wind three zero zero, eight knots, cleared for take off. ZU: Thank you. Understand, maintain five thousand feet until further advised. With departure checks recompleted the aircraft was lined up with the runway and the throttles opened up on the brakes to about 28 inches of boost. The power was confirmed set by both pilots and the brakes released. Zulu Uniform began its second take off run. ZU: Rolling. Rayment slowly opened the throttles against the stops and requested a full power check. The aircraft was now accelerating down the runway. Thain’s eyes scanned the instruments and confirmed the power setting. “Full power ch…….” His response was interrupted by a rising pressure gauge. The starboard engine was steady at 57.5 in boost pressure but the port indicator continued through 60in and went off the clock. “Abandon take off”. This time it was Thain who called out. The throttles were quickly closed with full braking applied, and the aircraft once again slowed to taxi speed half way down the runway. ZU: Munich, 609 Zulu Uniform, we are abandoning this take off as well. MT: Ah Roger, Cleared to backtrack. ZU: We would like to be cleared back to the tarmac, over. MT: Roger, cleared to the ramp. ZU: Understand, cleared to backtrack and cleared to the tarmac. Affirmative. MT: You are cleared to backtrack or cleared to taxi via crosswing – as desired. ZU: Roger. MT: B-line 609, do you wish to make another take off right now or do you wish to wait on the ramp? Over. ZU: 609, Zulu Uniform, I am returning to the tarmac. I am returning to the tarmac – to the terminal, over. MT: Roger, that is understood. The taxi from the runway back to the parking bay was achieved not without difficulty. While Rayment spoke to the passengers Thain took control and had some trouble following the lines of the runway with the fresh fall of snow. In the passenger cabin the Manchester United party listened attentively to the announcement explaining that a technical fault had prevented departure and it was now necessary to return to the apron for further checks. As the aircraft parked once again at the bay the tower was called with the message “609 Zulu Uniform, at the ramp”.
It was a less than jovial party that disembarked for a second time at Munich just 20 minutes after they had first departed. There was little doubt they were in for a long wait. Coffee was soon ordered for the group, and any feeling of apprehension quickly dispelled by the usual round of larking and joking. On the flight deck, Bill Black, the station engineer, joined the two pilots for further consideration of the boost problem. The recommended procedures had been followed with some success, and the only other answer was to retune the engines which would mean night stopping the aircraft. All agreed that this seemed a bit drastic. Since one engine was operating satisfactorily it was felt that if the throttles were opened up even more slowly there would be a good chance of eliminating the problem. If any fluctuation was still encountered it would be only marginal. It would, of course, mean take off speed being reached further down the runway, but since there was plenty of room available it wasn’t going to pose a problem. The two captains concurred and made the decision to give it another try. There was still the question of de-icing being required and the pilots talked over the situation with the ground engineer. The snow continued to fall but any accumulation on the wings had been adequately blown free with the two attempted take offs. Although the total upper wing surface could not be fully observed from the flight deck it could be seen that the thin film over the wing noticed earlier had dispersed and the odd fleck lying on the upper surfaces could hardly cause problems before the next take off. The same could not be said of the runway, although in line with contemporary knowledge little or no concern was expressed about the surface state. A West German Government minister was due later that day, and the airport vehicle, which had earlier briefly interrupted Zulu Uniform’s backtrack, now conducted an official inspection of the runway in anticipation of his arrival. About 1 centimetre of slush was reported as the minimum depth visible throughout the entire length, although pilot’s observations indicated that many areas were much deeper. Tracks were seen to be beaten over the first two thirds by previous aircraft movement but the last third of the runway was covered in an unbroken layer of wet slush. The survey was rapidly carried out with only cursory measurements being taken at a few points, yet the situation was considered to be satisfactory. On completion of the survey a Convair took off, spraying up great waves of slushy snow. It seems inconceivable, admittedly with hindsight, that no attempt was made to sweep at least part of the runway clear, but at the time there was little or no appreciation of the dangers of operating in such conditions. The total lack of knowledge then becomes self evident when it is considered that the present procedures for operating something as big as a Boeing 747 from a contaminated runway are very restrictive. Regulations permit a maximum depth of only 0.5in slush (13mm) or 1.5in dry snow (38mm). Nowadays motorists who drive in winter conditions also understand the problems associated with slush encounter; forward speed is immediately retarded and steering capability is markedly reduced. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of several centimetres of slush on aircraft acceleration. Any effort to clear some of the runway, even with a gang of workmen with shovels, would have been better than nothing. And yet that’s exactly what was done – nothing! Within the bounds of understanding – at that time – several centimetres of slush were thought to be satisfactory.
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Busby Babes
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